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Abstract
When several plainti¤s le individually a lawsuit against the same tort-
feasor, the resolution of the various cases through repeated trials produces
positive informational externalities, which benet to the later plainti¤s
(since there exist precedents, jurisprudence...). Thus, the rst lers may
have an incentive to initiate a class action as far as it enables the various
plainti¤s to share their information. This feature has not been stressed
in the literature, and in contrast strategic uses of class actions have been
studied in more details (Che (1996), Marceau and Mongrain (2003)).
In this paper, we elaborate on a basic strategic model of litigation
settlement, focusing on the interactions between the characteristics of the
discovery process (as a general technology of production of evidences) in
mass tort litigation, those of the compensation rules set by Courts, and
the structure of litigation costs, in order to study when a class action fails
to occur, and when sequential trials are more likely.
We consider the case of a perfect discovery process. We provide suf-
cient conditions under which a class action is formed. We show that
when victims have heterogeneous claims, the compensatory damages rule
awarded by Courts is of major importance for the formation of the class
action, whatever the degree of heterogeneity: all else equal, there always
exists a degree of damage averaging under which the class action occurs.
We also show that when contingent fees are used to reward attorneys
services, plainti¤s become neutral to the arrival of new information on
their case.
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1 Introduction
There is a general agreement concerning two e¤ects associated to the formation
of a class action (CA therafter).
On the one hand, CA entail aggregation and amplication e¤ects, which are
both individually and socially desirable. In practice, CA are used to consolidate
a large number of individual claims: and specically CA are rst designed to
encompass the smaller claims that otherwise would not obtain compensation. It
is well known that individual rationality implies that, the smaller claims under a
threshold depending on the litigation cost, are deterred from lling an individual
lawsuit, and thus never obtain compensatory damages. Thus, to the extent that
CA entail a decrease in the litigation cost, smaller claims are allowed to enter
into the litigation process, which is benecial for them. Moreover, once both the
larger and the smaller claim le a suit against the same tortfeasor, he receives
additional incentives to undertake the socially e¢ cient level of care. This is
because CA are supposed to lead to an increase in the probability of lawsuit,
given that when some victims are deterred from lling a individual suit, the
defendants probability of being sued is smaller than one, and he does not have
enough incentives to invest in the prevention activity. As a result, CA also
contribute to improve the preventive function of tort law.
On the second hand, CA are the source of signicant scales economies. Filling
a suit against a large tortfeasor (rm) may be quite complex and expensive for
an individual: it implies a waist of time, energy and various resources which
may be very expensive as compared to the capacity of the tortfeasor such that
a small plainti¤ may discouraged to ll against a large tortfeasor. In contrast, a
CA allows a decrease in litigation cost per individual, or allows plainti¤s to invest
in better experts than they did in the absence of class action (since the cost is
spread over all the members). Eventually, members of a CA may be specialized
on some tasks depending on their skill. Adding to these individual or internal
scales economies, there also exist some external or aggregate scales economies.
CA also entail a reduction of the number of individual courts appearances,
which is rst benecial for the members of the CA. But, it also induces an
improvement in the public services of justice: once a CA is initiated, the rate at
which all claims are resolved is increased. In words, CA are supposed to have
positive e¤ects on the congestion externalities of public services of justice.
Thus, the basic incentives to initiate and or join a CA identied in the
literature mainly depend on the value of 3 key parameters ; CA are more likely
when :
- the number of individuals similarly situated with respect to a common
defendant is very large.
- the loss borne by each party is relatively small.
- the administrative costs of individual suit are quite high.
Nevertheless, some authors have suggested that members of the CA may
also develop opportunistic or strategic behaviours. Two papers have best for-
malized the idea that a CA formation creates a situation of strategic interaction
between plainti¤s. Che (1996) focuses on the role of asymmetries of informa-
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tion, when asymmetries exist both between plainti¤s and the defendant, and
simultaneously between the members of a CA. Che assumes that two kinds of
plainti¤s (small claim, and large claim) sue against the same tortfeasor, and
have the opportunity to join a CA or to le individually; His question is: what
are the characteristics of the CA members? Specically, Che analyses the oc-
currence of two main market failures: either no CA is formed, while there exists
a potentially viable CA, or not all the plainti¤s are allowed to join the CA (and
specically, not all the smallest or weakest victims), but many opt out. Che
nds a multiplicity of equilibria, which globally conrm the prevalence of these
ine¢ ciencies; his ndings show that the characteristics of each equilibrium, that
is the composition of the CA, depends on the proportion of large stake in the
population of plainti¤s.
Marceau and Mongrain (2003) develop the idea that a CA has the charac-
teristics of a public good: in most jurisdictions where they are allowed (Canada
and United Sates), a CA is roughly speaking a non-rival and a non excludable
good; but this a public good which is privately produced, because a CA is usu-
ally provided by a only a subset of plainti¤s (in their analysis, a single plainti¤):
once the CA is created against a tortfeasor, all the victims have the opportunity
to join it, and thus benet from the provision of the good without having to in-
cur the initial cost associated to the formation of the CA: this cost corresponds
to the various expenditures (in time and nancial resources) required to coordi-
nate the various individual claims. For the representative member, this cost is
a sunk cost, and it is borne only by the initiator of the CA. Hence, given that
for everyone it is better to join a CA already formed than to initiate it, there
is a problem of free-riding, which is formalized by Marceau and Mongrain as
a war of attrition: on the one hand, each plainti¤ has an incentive to wait that
someone else initiates the CA (because of the sunk cost) but on the second, he
bears a penalty in waiting (time is also costly). The ndings of Marceau and
Mongrain show that the identity of the CA initiator depends on the rule of
compensation awarded by courts to the CA members: small levels of damage
averaging tend to give incentives to the holder of the smallest claim to be the
initiator of the CA. Two other results are worth mentioning: rst, when they
introduce the existence of nuisance suits or small claims that would be de-
terred from an individual suit, M and M show that these individuals are passive
members: they join the CA but never initiate it; second, they nd that a large
CA never occurs, that is the largest claims have always an incentive to opt out
the CA and to sue individually.
The existence of informational asymmetries, or the fact that a CA has the
characteristics of a club good are certainly important since they explain that
the exclusion of some plainti¤s may arise, and specically the weakest victims.
Nevertheless, it seems that another argument should counterbalance these ef-
fects, but as far as we are aware, it has not been yet formally investigated.
Our starting point is that when parties enter into the litigation process, they
also access to a discovery process: before going to trial, arties collect evidences,
testimonies, expertises and so on. And they share some information during the
pretrial negotiation period; eventually, the plainti¤ and the defendant will con-
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verge towards the same assessment of the outcome at trial; this is well known;
But there are many reasons explaining that plainti¤s also share, voluntary
or not, the information they have collected, although they are engaged in indi-
vidual lawsuits against the same defendant: this is the case for example, when
several victims are injured by the same tortfeasor, not in the same acciden-
tal event but after several accidents in a quite long period of time (think of :
asbestos litigation, lawsuits against tobacco industry, medicine malpractice, or
product liability . . . ). In this case, plainti¤s do not enter simultaneously (at the
same date) into the litigation process, but they enter sequentially (at di¤erent
dates). Hence, they have access to di¤erent information but this does not re-
ect informational asymmetries per se, but incomplete information for the rst
plainti¤s, since as time is passing, new or more robust evidences arrive, less
controversial scientic proofs are available.
As a result, some uncertainty is quite « naturally » resolved between the
period where the rst claims are settled and the period where the later plainti¤s
le, meaning that there exist positive informational externalities between plain-
ti¤s, which normally arise when similar individual cases are successively resolved
by courts; later llers may benet from the experience of the rst plainti¤s be-
cause of the jurisprudence, or the inuence of precedents on the behaviour of
courts. On the other hand, these informational externalities allow later plain-
ti¤s to update their beliefs on the likelihood to win at trial, and thus they may
undertake more accurate decisions.
According to this view, CA may be understood as a useful tool used by
plainti¤s to internalise these positive externalities of information. Specically,
CA allow the earlier victims to retain part of the benets of these externali-
ties, that otherwise they would never recover. We can imagine that the CAs
attorney play an active role in the transmission of information between the
members: the economies of scales associated to the pooling of attorneys service
(usual argument) which have an e¤ect on the litigation cost per individual are
also associated to informational externalities which are important to assess the
expected gain at trial. More specically, when they become members of a CA,
plainti¤s become aware of the existence of the correlation between the individ-
ual losses; this new information may induce plainti¤s to become more condent
with their chances of success at trial against the same defendant! More gener-
ally, plainti¤s are necessarily led to update their initial beliefs corresponding to
the likelihood that the defendant is liable.
In our work, we focus on the impact of information sharing between plain-
ti¤s, and we compare the case where CA are forbidden, to the case where they
are allowed. We also add another feature: we think that main informational
asymmetries exist not between parties opposed in a litigation, but between on
the one hand both parties opposed at trial, and on the other the judge. In
many countries (both under common law and civil law) procedural rules hold
such that parties opposed in a litigation have a legal right to the discovery, that
is each party has a free access to the evidences and the various documents that
the other party has gathered and will produce at trial: hence, there is a legal
impossibility of newsat trial. In contrast, some empirical works display that
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there exist kind of heterogeneity in the decisions of courts, concerning similar
cases they have had to resolve. So once the parties have collected evidences,
testimonies and so on, a great uncertainty remains as to the outcome at trial:
what will be the decision of the judge? A related problem is the emergence
of new legal doctrines. For example in the United States, the problem with
the asbestos litigation in the eightys comes partly from the fact that the legal
doctrines to apply was not yet developed. So in our work, the main source of
uncertainty is coming from the attitude of courts.
In the rest of the paper, we exhibit the importance of three main features
concerning the issue of CA formation, when there exist (positive) informational
externalities between plainti¤s ling a suit against the same tortfeasor: the
characteristics of the discovery process (the technology of production of infor-
mation: evidences, testimonies, expertises . . . ), those of the compensation rules
set by courts (individual damage for individual suits or damage averaging for
class action), and the size of scales economies on the litigation costs, in order
to exhibit su¢ cient conditions under which a class action is formed allowing
plainti¤s to share their information. Section 2 describes the simple model. We
characterize in section 3, a set of (subgame perfect) equilibria associated to the
existence of the large class action (including both types of plainti¤s). We show
that when plainti¤s expect to never obtain bad news, a su¢ cient condition
in order that they le is that their priors are optimistic. More specically,
we show that when plainti¤s expect to obtain at least one good news in the
future, such a class action is more likely to occur the smaller the proportion
of plainti¤s having the small stake and the larger the scales economies on the
litigation costs. Finally in section 4, we analyse the impact of alternative rules
of attorneys fees (xed payments, contingent fees, payments proportional to
the value of the case).
2 The basic set up
2.1 basic motivations
Consider a situation where the same individual, for example through the occur-
rence of several successive individual accidents, injures a group of victims. If
class actions are legally forbidden, (all or only some of these) victims will enter
sequentially into the litigation process, and will le individually against this
tortfeasor. In this case, it is natural to consider that repeated trials entail pos-
itive informational externalities which are benecial only to the later plainti¤s
: the earlier plainti¤s who have worse or less ne information may undertake
actions that otherwise they would not choose to follow had they obtained bet-
ter information. In contrast, the plainti¤s who enter later on in the litigation
process may benet of the experience of the earlier ones (either because of the
jurisprudence, or because of the existence of precedents), and are allowed to
undertake more accurate decisions regarding the various legal options, which
are available (le or exit; go to trial, settle amicably or give up).
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This correspond to a kind of passive transmission of information coming
from the earlier plainti¤s, or a case of non-voluntary information sharing, but
a problem arises because the rst plainti¤s have no means to benet of the
information collected by their successors or to retain privately part of the ben-
ets associated to the positive informational externality they create. In this
spirit, the formation of a class action may be understood as a tool allowing to
internalise these externalities : it allows the earlier plainti¤s to benet of the
existence of positive informational externalities that otherwise they would never
recover when only individual suits are possible. More generally, we can easily
imagine that the formation of a class action makes easier the transmission of
information between the plainti¤s. For example, when they become members of
a class action, plainti¤s become aware of the existence of a correlation between
the individual losses, and this new information may induce them to become
more condent with their chances of success at trial against the defendant. As
a consequence, apart of economies of scales coming from the pooling of attor-
neys services, there exist strong incentives in favour of the formation of a class
action which result from information sharing between plainti¤s : specically, the
pooling of individual information allows all of them to improve their individual
assessment of the expected gain at trial.
In this paper we focus on these incentives to share information between
plainti¤s suing the same tortfeasor, and we investigate their consequences for
the existence of a class action. In our set up, the characteristic features of the
available information (the discovery process) are such that:
1. whatever the available information, plainti¤s are not condent with re-
spect to their chances of success at trial, i.e. they can not know whether the
judge will be favourable to their case; on the one and, it is relatively easy to
assess the value of individual damages (which may be considered as a public
information), but on the second, the cause of the victimsinjury may be quite
di¢ cult or costly to establish; thus, the plainti¤sindividual assessment of the
likelihood to win at trial are always smaller than 1.
2. before entering into the litigation process, all (types of) plainti¤s have
common priors (same initial assessment of the likelihood that they will win at
trial); but when they le a suit, and since they enter at di¤erent dates into the
discovery process, they obtain di¤erent additional information: more speci-
cally, the later the entry into the litigation process, the ner the information
obtained; given that the new information allows each plainti¤ to update his
initial beliefs, this explains why the di¤erent types of plainti¤s have di¤erent
posteriors beliefs;
3. the defendant has access to the same information as the plainti¤, for
any date in the litigation process; in practice, legal arrangements guarantee
him the rights of discovery; for example, in many countries, there exists a legal
impossibility of newsor surprisesat trial: each party has a free access to
the evidences and the various documents that the other party has gathered and
will produce at trial.
4. each plainti¤ evaluates (ex ante) the opportunity to le a suit or to give
up, knowing that he will benet of a new information later on once he will be
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engaged in the litigation process, and knowing that this information will give a
new assessment of his chances at trial, such that he will undertake ex post the
best decision (whether he exits, goes to trial or accepts the defendants o¤er)
conditionally on his information.
This way, we capture two salient characteristics of the litigation process:
i) In practice, main informational asymmetries exist between on the one hand
the judge, and on the second both parties opposed at trial. Thus, the main
relevant source of uncertainty for parties is explainable by the behaviour and
ultimate decision of the judge at trial, which is not known ex ante. In contrast,
the pre-trial negotiation period leads to the revelation of the relevant private
information between parties  given the existence of a legal impossibility of
news or surprises at trial. ii) There are several reasons explaining why
most of the time, plainti¤s cannot have the certainty to win at trial:
- scientic evidences may not allow concluding with certainty, but consisting
in known or likely causalities associated to statistical frequencies, or intervals of
probabilities,
- some evidences may be strongly controversial, and always in the scientic
debate,
- there may exist a large disagreement between expertsopinions, and obvi-
ously between the plainti¤s experts and those of the defendant,
- nally, we can also take into account human mistakes when information
is ambiguous, and introduce for example the possibility that judges may have
bias of judgment, mistaken beliefs, and/or that they unfortunately reject some
pieces of evidences.
A related problem concerning collective accidents and mass tort class action
is the emergence of new legal doctrines, which creates hard uncertainty for par-
ties. For example in the United States, the problem with the asbestos litigation
in the eightys comes partly from the fact that the legal doctrines to apply was
not yet developed.
Formally, we introduce this problem of information arrival and beliefs updat-
ing in a simple three-stage game, where two types of plainti¤s (large stake/low
stake) le sequentially a lawsuit against a defendant. In a rst stage, the rst
type decides either to sue individually or to initiate a class action; then, in
the second stage, the second type decides either to le an individual suit or to
join the class action when it has been previously formed; nally, in the third
stage, the defendant makes one take-it-or-leave-ito¤er either to an individual
plainti¤ or to the representative member of a class action.
In the next paragraph, we introduce the formal model; we consider that two
(types of) plainti¤s have been injured by the same individual either through two
di¤erent individual accidental events occurring in a short period of time, thus
implying repeated trials. They are supposed to be heterogenous in their claim
of damage awards (or equivalently in the loss they have experienced): plainti¤
denoted P i has low stake i, while plainti¤ denoted P j has a high stake j > i.
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2.2 the sequence of individual decisions
We consider a simple three-stage game, where plainti¤s enter sequentially in the
litigation process against the defendant, such that P i is the rst ler. In stage
1, P i may choose between two options: either he les or he exits. In this last
case, everything is over for him, and then, P j has only to decide for himself
whether he enters and les individually, or if he exits. If P i opts for ling,
two institutional choices are available to him: either he can sue individually,
or he can decide to initiate a class action, to which every individuals that have
su¤ered a damage may join. In stage 2 beginning after P is move, P j chooses
either to sue individually or to register to become a member of the class action.
As it is usual in the literature, we assume that the membership is voluntary
and open, such that the presence of a class action does not legally compel other
plainti¤s to join it, and no individual plainti¤ is denied membership against
his wishes. In practice, Courts decide to maintain a class action or not, and
prescribe deadlines for claimants participation or opt out decisions. In the
present set up, this reects the equilibrium behaviors of plainti¤s, in such a
way that after a limited period of time during which any individual has the
opportunity to opt out of the class action, the membership becomes binding:
no class action member can opt out, and no new plainti¤ can opt in. Moreover,
once a class action is formed, which is requiring that more than one plainti¤
register, it sues on behalf of all its members. Here, no di¤erence is made between
the case where the representative plainti¤ who has initiated the class action
litigates for all members, or the case where the active role is played by the class
actions attorney. We assume that the delegation of the collective negotiation
power to one of the member or to a third party leads to no agency problem and
does not require any incentive scheme to monitor the e¤orts of the class action
representative agent, who is supposed always to act in the best interest of all
its members.
In stage 3 nally, we consider that pretrial negotiations may also take place,
leading to an amicable settlement of claims rather than their litigation at trial.
That is, after that a suit (individual or collective) is brought against the de-
fendant, this one has the opportunity to make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the
other party (individual plainti¤ or class action). Thus, either the defendants
o¤er is accepted (by a plainti¤ or the class action), and thus the claim is settled,
or it is rejected. In this event, we consider that either the claim goes to trial,
or the plainti¤ gives up.
As for the Courts behavior, it is assumed that the judge awards a compen-
satory damage equal to the claim of the defendant in case of an individual suit,
while he sets the damage obtained by each member of a class action equal to an
index of the aggregate merit of the class, which is dened as  = i+(1 )j ,
with  2]0; 1[ being either the proportion of plainti¤s i in the population of l-
ers, or an parameter of the discretion power of judges. The role of this rule
of damage averaging is part of the present paper, and the distinction between
those possible explanations will be discussed in the last part of the paper.
The individual outcomes also depend on the various litigation expenditures
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incurred by the plainti¤, since ling a suit is a costly activity. When lling an
individual suit both plainti¤s bear the same litigation costs, which are of two
kinds. The rst one corresponds to the administrative registration of the claim,
C > 0; which is supposed to be a sunk cost: whatever his decision, either he
maintains his action until it is settled through a negotiation with the defendant
or at trial, or he gives up after registration, the plainti¤ never recovers this
expenditure. The second one, Cp > 0 , corresponds to litigation costs per se such
as attorney fees, auditing or expertise costs and so on, that are borne only when
the plainti¤ les, to produce evidences in order to strengthen the Courts beliefs
that the defendant is liable. In contrast, joining a class action allows plainti¤s
to litigate for smaller individual costs, Kp > 0: Moreover, members of the class
action incur an additional sunk cost K > 0 (corresponding to registration costs
and various administrative costs). We assume that:
ASSUMPTION 1: j > i > Cp
ASSUMPTION 2: 0 < Kp < Cp; and 0 < K < Kp
which means that if a plainti¤ were aware of the defendants liability, he
would be prone to sue individually. Notice that the conditions in (2) put on
the various transaction costs simply insures that a class action entails scales
economies on the various litigation costs: C + Cp > K +Kp. Scales economies
achieved through the pooling of attorneys services and the decrease in the
number of plainti¤s individual appearances in front of the Court, are a classical
motive to explain the great appeal of class actions.
The present terminology and denition of the nature of both kinds of costs
are introduced for ease of exposition. The clue of the story is coming from
the distinction between an entry cost which is paid in order that the plainti¤
have an access to the litigation process, on the one hand, and a cost paid only
when the plainti¤ continues his suit until the end at trial, on the second. Notice
that a more sensible interpretation would consider that C as K correspond
both to administrative costs per se coming from the registration of the claim in
from of the Court plus the various sunk costs associated to the use of attorneys
counsels (xed costs such as ling costs, including expertise expenditures) during
the pretrial period, whereas Cp as Kp would include more strictly only the
expenditures incurred by the plainti¤ when his case goes to trial, for instance
those corresponding to the frais de représentation et de plaidoirie.
2.3 the discovery process and individual information
In our set up where the plainti¤s enter sequentially in the litigation process,
a specic timing of information arrival is required, which may be stylized as
follows:
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FIGURE 1: the timing of information and decisions
We consider circumstances where all the information which may be obtained
(the set of all possible messages) by P j is the same as what is available for the
former P i . Thus, everything goes as if the messages successively obtained by
the litigants were initially drowned in the same set of messages1 . But, basically,
although both plainti¤s have access to the same technology of information, they
have not the ability to update their initial beliefs using the same information:
plainti¤ Pi enters rst and only observes his own message, while plainti¤ Pj ob-
serve a combination of two messages, consisting in his own message and plainti¤
P 0is personal message.
Formally, let us denote 
 the set of all available messages providing some
piece of evidence with respect to the liability or guiltiness of the defendant.
When the P i (respectively Pj) pays the litigation costs, he receives a message
! (respectively !0) randomly picked in 
; which will be used to improve his
assessment of the likelihood that the defendant will be found liable/not liable
at trial.
Since we consider the case of an aggregate technology of information, let us
take as a primitive the joint probability distribution2 P : S  
  
 ! [0; 1];
where S = fL;NLg is the set of relevant states of the nature regarding the
status of the defendant (Liable, Non liable) such that p(L; !; !0)  0 is the
likelihood that the defendant is liable and the messages obtained respectively
by plainti¤s i and j are (!; !0); while p(NL;!; !0)  0 is the likelihood that the
defendant is non liable and the messages obtained respectively by P i and Pj
are (!; !0).
1Thus, under some circumstances, plainti¤ j may receive exactly the same message as
plainti¤ i: the weight of evidence or the signicance of the message is increased in such a case.
2See Hirschleifer and Riley (1997), La¤ont (2000) for the basic case of an unidimensional
technology of information. The specication in terms of joint probabilities is not the more
natural or intuitive way to modelize the technology of information, but it is the more general!
Anyway, any service of messages reveals the existence of such a joint probability distribution.
Here, we are more interested with the benets associated to the process of beliefs updating
allowed by this technology, than on the distortions coming from di¤erence between pure
individual subjective priors.
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2.4 beliefs updating rules
It is well known that the primitives allow to assess the various probabilities
which are relevant in order to describe the informational status of plainti¤s, at
each stage of the litigation process. Specically, our general assumption implies
that individuals have common priors, but that beliefs updating allows them to
have di¤erent posteriors.
First, the primitives are connected to the plainti¤scommon priors on the
defendants liability in a simple way:
pL =
X
(!;!0)2
2
p(L; !; !0)
pNL =
X
(!;!0)2
2
p(NL;!; !0)
Using the available technology of information, the plainti¤s are also allowed
to assess their chances to obtain additional information. For example:
pi(!) =
X
!02

p(L; !; !0) +
X
!02

p(NL;!; !0)
represents P is individual priors to obtain an individual message, when the
message obtained by the other plainti¤ is not observable. In our set up, where
P j les after P i , we are interested by the case where P j has the opportunity
to observe also the message previously obtained by i; hence, the probability of
such an event according to the technology of information at hand is:
pj(!; !0) = p(L; !; !0) + pNL(!; !0)
As a consequence, P j will update his beliefs according to the rule:
(R1) : pj(Lj!; !0) = p(L; !; !
0)
p(L; !; !0) + p(NL;!; !0)
when he observes both his own message and the message of the other plainti¤,
but P i can only condition his revision of beliefs on a unique message according
to the rule:
(R2) : pi(Lj!) =
P
!02
 p(L; !; !
0)P
!02
 p(L; !; !0) +
P
!02
 p(NL;!; !0)
with:
p(L;w) =
X
!02

p(L; !; !0)
In this context, the possible evidences that may be gathered during the
discovery process does not change after that P i eventually les and before P j
decides to enter. Nevertheless, P j may benet of the message obtained by P i
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(he benets of the e¤orts undertaken by the former in the discovery process).
Thus, he may update his likelihood of success according to both messages.3
3 Equilibrium Analysis
We rst introduce as a benchmark model the case of a system allowing only
individual suits: thus two repeated trials occur. Then, we introduce the possi-
bility of a class action, plainti¤ having the opportunity either to sue individually
of to register a class action.
3.1 precedents, repeated trials and pure individual suits
When repeated trials occur (P is case is rst settled), the last ler may benet
of the existence of jurisprudence or precedents as a result of a pure informational
e¤ect. We investigate how this involuntary sharing of information between plain-
ti¤s a¤ects the individual incentives to le.
Hence, assume that the class action is not allowed as a litigation option:
plainti¤s can le only an individual suit. Playersmoves in stage 3 are the
following: for the defendant, make an individual o¤er for each plainti¤; and
each individual plainti¤may choose between: go to trial T; exit E; settle S). Let
us denote s(i; !) and s(j ; !; !0) the settlement o¤er made by the defendant
respectively to P i and P j , since it depends on the case and the information
obtained.
When a case is litigated, any information which is revealed is always shared
between the plainti¤ and the defendant. In the present set up, the defendant
always exercise his rights to the discovery process, since it allows him either to
settle for an o¤er lesser than when the plainti¤ is silent, and/or to litigate while
saving the trial costs. The following lemma rst solves for the e¢ cient decision
of the defender and the response of the plainti¤s when the last stage of the game
is seen as a one-shotbargaining process, exhibited in gure 2:
3 In some circumstances however, P j may gather an additional information, which is
whether the evidence that should have been by the previous plainti¤ (even when he only
obtained partial information) is or not always available or true. In words, some events previ-
ously unbelievable are now available as pieces of evidence, and more specically are seen as
acceptable by Courts (unforseen contingencies). This case will be investigate in a compagon
paper.
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FIGURE 2 : stage 3 in the pure individual suits game
Lemma 1 Consider plainti¤s and defendants moves in stage 3:
i) For any message ! 2 
, corresponding to the information obtained by Pi ,
the best one shot individual o¤er made by the defendant to plainti¤ Pi is:
s(i; !) = max
 
0; pj(Lj!)i   Cp

. Pi accepts this o¤er4 .
ii) For any combination of messages (!; !0) 2 
  
, corresponding to the
information obtained by Pj , the best one shot individual o¤er made by the
defendant to plainti¤ Pj is s(j ; !; !0) = max(0; pj(Lj!; !0)j Cp). Pj accepts
this o¤er.
The proof and those of all lemmas and propositions of the paper are a¤orded
in the appendix.
Coming back to stage 2, P j evaluates his own opportunity to le or not
without the knowledge of the relevant message that will be available in the
future, but only knowing the set of possible messages a¤orded by the available
technology of information. Let us denote his expected utility level given the
various possible messages that he may receive as follows:
Euj(j ; p
j(Lj:; :)) =
X
(!;!0)2
2
pj(!; !0)max
 
0; pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp
  C
and given the priors, let us denote his expected utility level as:
4As far as Subgame Perfection is concerned, we should also consider the case where the
plainti¤ goes to trial, thus allowing for multiplicity of equilibria; however for concretness,
we adopt in the rest of the paper the convention that the indi¤erence between trial and
seetlement amounts to a strict preference for the settlement. See the discussion in Rasmusen
(2001), Shavell (1989).
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Euj(j ; pL) = pLj   Cp   C
The following lemma analyses when plainti¤ Pj sues or gives up.
Lemma 2 i) Assume that only good newsare expected to arrive; then, infor-
mation is not worth for Pj i.e.:
if min

pj(Lj!; !0); for all (!; !0) 2 
 
	  Cp
j
, then:
Euj(j ; p
j(Lj:; :)) = pLj   Cp   C
ii) Assume that there exists a unique combination of messages (!^; !^0) 2

  
 such that p(L; !^; !^0)  Cpj ; then, information is worth for Pj , i.e. :
Euj(j ; p
j(Lj:; :))  Euj(j ; pL)  0:
iii) Assume that there exists at least one combination of messages (!^; !^0) 2

  
 such that p(L; !^; !^0)  Cp+Cj ; then Pj always les individually, i.e.
Euj(j ; p
j(Lj:; :))  0.
Part i) implies that if priors are optimistic for P j , then P j always les,
i.e. pL  Cp+Cj =) Euj(j ; pj(Lj:; :))  0, but if pL <
Cp+C
j
then the plainti¤
gives up (Euj(j ; pj(Lj:; :)) < 0).
Part ii) means that if priors are pessimistic for P j , then P j may never-
theless le, i.e. we may have Euj(j ; pj(Lj:; :))  0 although pL  Cp+Cj .
Part iii) means that once there exists a very good news, the plainti¤ always
prefer to le an individual suit.
The same qualitative results also apply to P i : in stage 1, he evaluates the
opportunity to le or not without the knowledge of the relevant message that
will be available in the future, but only knowing the set of possible messages
a¤orded by the available technology of information. Let us dene by:
Eui(i; p
i(Lj:)) =
X
!2

pi(!)max
 
0; pi(Lj!)i   Cp
  C
his expected utility level associated to the technology of information, and:
Eui(i; pL) = pLi   Cp   C
his satisfaction level associated to his priors, which are the same as the other
plainti¤. Thus, we have:
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Lemma 3 i) Assume that only good newsare expected to arrive; then, infor-
mation is not worth for Pi , i.e.:
if min

pi(Lj!); for all ! 2 
	  Cp
i
, then:
Eui(i; p
i(Lj:)) = pLi   Cp   C
ii) Assume that there exists a unique message !^ 2 
 such that p(L; !^)  Cpi ;
then, information is worth for Pi , i.e.: Eui(i; pi(Lj:))  Eui(i; pL)  0:
iii) Assume that there exists at least one message !^ 2 
 such that p(L; !^) 
Cp+C
i
; then Pi always les individually, i.e. Eui(i; pi(Lj:))  0.
Saying di¤erently, lemma 2 and 3 display the conditions under which a plain-
ti¤ obtains an informational rent as a result of the discovery process. Informa-
tion has a positive value in the present context only when litigants know that
bad news sometimes may be obtained. With additional information, a plainti¤
updates his priors, and he is allowed to undertake the best possible decision in
every circumstances, given that he can exercise an exit option if the information
learned appears to be unfavorable for his case.
In this sense, introducing arrival of new information and updating of beliefs
may explain that holders of nuisance suits or pessimistic victims (conditionally
on their priors: i.e. pL   Cp   C < 0) have an incentive to le, in the hope
to learn good news in the future and pursue until trial their action. In this last
case, it depends on stronger conditions on the technology of information.
This is highlighted in parts iii) of the lemmas. Each of Parts iii gives a simple
su¢ cient condition required whatever the priors (optimistic or pessimistic) in
order to induce a plainti¤ to le an individual lawsuit, saying that the plain-
ti¤ knows that there exists at least a very favorable message entailing a large
probability that the defendant will be seen liable by the Court. This last re-
sult may be understood as saying that it is of no use that a plainti¤ expect to
always receive a favorable message in the future, to induce him to le a suit:
it is su¢ cient that there exists a single favorable message, given that in others
circumstances, he will be induced to give up having only paid the administrative
sunk costs.
In contrast, Part i of both lemmas shows interestingly enough that when the
available (technology of) information does not allow the possibility of bad events
or news, such that the plainti¤s expect to obtain a positive payment from the
defendant in any future event, then the discovery process provides no additional
value in the sense that whether plainti¤s update their priors depending on the
new message collected or use their priors, in both cases they undertake the same
e¢ cient decision.
Lemmas 1 to 3 lead to the following proposition:
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Proposition 4 Assume that there exists at least one combination of messages
(!^; !^0) 2 
  
 such that p(L; !^; !^0)  Cp+Ci ; then there exists a Subgame
Perfect Equilibrium where i) each plainti¤ le individually, and ii) both cases
are settled.
Remark that the requirement that there exists a p(L; !^; !^0)  Cp+Ci also
implies that p(L; !^; !^0)  Cp+Cj ; meaning that any information delivered by the
technology which appears as favorable for Pi is also good for Pj . As it is easily
seen, this is a weak requirement in the sense that it is su¢ cient that plainti¤s are
aware of the fact that there is one chance to obtain at least a good information,
to induce them to le a suit. There is no need to be sure that good news always
arrive in the future.
The next corollary is a straightforward consequence of the previous lemmas:
Corollary 5 If information has a positive value:
i) Any information favourable to the defendant (respectively, to the plainti¤s)
reduces (increases) the settlement o¤er, as compared to the case where no no
additional information arrives.
ii) The probability of settlement is smaller than one.
Consider the case of the rst plainti¤ - the argument is the same in the other
case. A favourable information for the defendant corresponds to a message such
that pL > pi(Lj!) which implies pLi   Cp > pi(Lj!)i   Cp. Now, in the
case where information is worth, there is only a subset i  
 of possible
messages for the rst plainti¤ such that pi(Lj!)i   Cp > 0, 8! 2 i : then,
the probability of settlement corresponds to the cumulative probability that the
plainti¤ obtains these favourable messages
P
!2i p(!) < 1:
3.2 information sharing and the large class action
Consider now that class actions are available. Let us focus more specically on
the proper subgame beginning after P j decides to adhere to the class action.
In stage 3, the defender makes an o¤er to the class action members, such that
when the information pooled by the members of the class action corresponds to
the messages (!; !0), the settlement benet of each member of the class action
is s(; !; !0).
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FIGURE 3 : stage 3 in the class action game
Lemma 6 Consider the decision node in stage 3 where the defendant is facing
a class action. For any combination of messages (!; !0) 2 

, the best one
shotindividual o¤er made by the defendant to the class action is: s(; !; !0) =
max
 
0; pj(Lj!; !0) Kp

. The class action members accept this o¤er.
This implies that the defendant makes a positive o¤er to the class action
soon as pj(Lj!; !0) > Kp : On the other hand, in any proper subgame in stage 3
beginning after that P i gives up to initiate a class action, or after that P i gives
up to join it, the best individual o¤ers of the defendant are those of lemma 1
(see also gure 3 where these subgames have been replaced by the defendants
best o¤er).
We can now analyze the e¢ cient decisions of P j , considering separately the
decision to join or not the class action (decision node following the entry of P j),
and nally the decision to le or not (decision node initiating the subgame of
gure 3). P js e¢ cient decisions in stage 2 may be as follows:
Lemma 7 Assume that there exists a subset5 of combinations of messages j 
5 It is easy to see that this subset would be a singleton, i.e. the weakest su¢ cient condition
required to have the same result of the lemma may be stated as follows: Assume that there
exists at least one combination of messages (!^; !^0) 2 j : p(L; !^; !^0)  Cp+Cj ; and assume
that   Cp Kp
pj(Lj!^;!^0)(j i)
.
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2 such that for any (!; !0) 2 j : p(L; !; !0)  Cp+Cj ; and assume that  
  Cp Kp(j i) where  = max

pj(Lj!; !0); for all (!; !0) 2 j
	
. Then, i) Pj
always les in the second stage, and ii) he prefers to join the class action when
it has been initiated by Pi rather than to sue individually.
The following lemma focuses on the decision of the rst plainti¤.
Lemma 8 Assume that there exists a subset of messages i  
, such that for
any ! 2 i : pi(L; !)  Cp+Ci . Thus, Pi always les in the rst stage, and he
prefers to initiate the class action rather than to sue individually.
Using the material of lemmas 6 to 8, we have:
Proposition 9 Assume that: (C1) there exists a unique combination of mes-
sages (!; !0) 2 
2 such that p(L; !^; !^0)  Cp+Ci , and (C2):   ^ 
Cp Kp
pj(Lj!^;!^0)(j i) :
Then, there exists a SPE where i) the class action is formed, and ii) the aggre-
gate case is settled.
Proposition 9 displays a set of su¢ cient conditions in order that the large
class action (encompassing both types of individuals) exists in equilibrium.
The result of proposition 9 is a direct consequence both of our specication of
the technology of information, and of the assumption that the discovery process
is perfect in the sense that there is a perfect mutualization of the information
between plainti¤s and the defendant. In such a case, the two crucial issues are
1/ whether the rst plainti¤ prefers the structure of information dened by the
set of his own personal messages, or the structure associated to the combination
of two messages, his personal one and the information of the other plainti¤; 2/
whether the second one obtains a higher payments when he becomes a member
of the class action or not.
In the present context, P j observes his own message and the rst plainti¤s
one whether or not he joins the class action; thus, he preferres to join the class
action as long as the decrease in the litigation costs associated to the collective
action (Kp < Cp) is not fully compensated by the decrease in the expected
payment awarded at trial given that the Court uses an index of the aggregate
claim in case of a class action ( < j): (C2) corresponds to the requirement
needed to insure the participation of Pj : it must be that the proportion of large
stakes in population of plainti¤ is high enough.
The result may be easily generalized, as in lemma 6, to introduce several
messages being good news for plainti¤s in the sense of (C1). Nevertheless,
consider the case where there is only a single combination (!^; !^0) satisfying
(C1); then, the threshold ^ may work as follows:
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CASE 1: pj(Lj!^; !^0)i  Kp > pj(Lj!^; !^0)j   Cp =) ^ > 1
The inequality means that up to sunk costs, the expected outcome at trial
of Pi when the class action is formed is larger than the expected outcome of Pj
for an individual suit, given the nature of the information obtained by plainti¤
(given pj(Lj!^; !^0)). Then, any value of  > 0 satises condition (C2), which is
thus irrelevant in proposition 9. This is because in such a case, we also have:
pj(Lj!^; !^0) Kp > pj(Lj!^; !^0)i  Kp > pj(Lj!^; !^0)j   Cp
which insures that Pj always prefers to register the class action.
CASE 2: pj(Lj!^; !^0)i  Kp < pj(Lj!^; !^0)j   Cp =) ^ < 1
As a result, the constraint on the proportion of small losses applies, with the
threshold depending as follows on the parameters of the economy:
Cp  Kp j   i pj(Lj!^; !^0)
^ +    
On the other hand, the basic reason explaining why the rst plainti¤ initi-
ates the class action, is that when the discovery process is perfect, the posteriors
distribution pj(Lj:; :) is more informative in the sense of Blackwell (1953) than
the posteriors distribution pj(Lj:): for any message ! 2 
; there always exists
at least one message !0 2 
 such that: pj(Lj!; !0) > pi(Lj!) and one mes-
sage !00 2 
 such that: pj(Lj!; !00) < pi(Lj!). Thus, the posterior beliefs
pi(Lj:) provides the plainti¤ with some information which has been garbled
in the transmission as compared to the priors pj(Lj:; :). Anything goes as if the
information associated to pj(Lj:; :) were sent, but it has been received by Pi
with some additional noise, such that nally Pi recognized only the information
attached to pi(Lj:):
4 Extensions: damage averaging, conditional and
contingent fees
It is straightforward to verify that when plainti¤s having large stake become the
rst lers, nothing more is added to the results, since the class action is formed
under the same conditions as those in proposition 9. Thus, as far as the discov-
ery process is perfect, the choice of the order of plainti¤sentry introduce no
strategic aspect. In contrast, alternative specications of costs or compensation
rules applied by Court may have more serious consequences.
In this section, we rst consider the impact of alternative rules of damage
awarded by Courts, and specically, the role of damage averaging. Finally, we
introduce alternative schemes for attorneyfees and investigate their inuence
on the formation of a class action in the present set up.
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4.1 Courtsbehavior and the damage averaging rule
The rule of damage award set by Courts is of major importance in context where
the entry of di¤erent plainti¤s entail a strategic aspect as it is the case enhanced
by Mongrain and Marceau (2003), since it induces both the composition of the
class action and the identity/type of the plainti¤ who initiates the class action.
Interestingly enough this also occurs in our set up: we may suggest another
interpretation of condition (C2) in proposition 8, which is a central condition
for the occurrence of the class action to the extent that it monitors the behavior
of large stakes holders.
Assume that Courts award a compensation to each member of a class action
which is dened as the weighted sum of his personal claim and the aggregate
value of the class action; formally: ds =  + (1   )s, with  2 [0; 1], for
any Ps (s = i; j). In the following,  will be termed the degree of damage
averaging. When  = 1, Courts award the aggregate merits of the class action
to each member, while when  = 0, the Courts award only individual damages.
Straightforward manipulations show that:
di = (1  (1  ))i + (1  )j
dj = i + (1  )j
As a result, the following result applies:
Proposition 10 Assume (C1); then, there always exists a degree of damage
averaging such that the large class action occurs in equilibrium, i.e. there exists
a threshold degree of damage averaging namely:   Cp Kppj(Lj!^;!^0)(j i) ; such
that for any    the large class action is formed at equilibrium.
Once more, it is easy to see that soon as6 pj(Lj!^; !^0)i Kp > pj(Lj!^; !^0)j 
Cp holds, which implies that
Cp Kp
pj(Lj!^;!^0)(j i) > 1; then all else equal the exis-
tence of a class action is compatible with any (positive) value of the level of
damage averaging - or equivalently, the rule set by the Court is of no matter.
In the opposite case, however, the Court has the opportunity to favor (or not)
the formation of the class action, whatever the structure of the population of
plainti¤s. Allowing a large degree of damage averaging, and plainti¤ having
large stake are deter from participating to the class action when it has been
initiated, since the decrease in litigation costs does not compensate the loss in
terms of compensatory damage. Thus, it is a matter of precaution when Courts
set compensatory damages to members of a class action as close as possible to
their individual claims.
6This condition has a nice interpretation, saying that the expected payment obtained by a
small loss holder when Court applies full individual damages to any member of a class action,
is higher than the expected payment to a large stake holder suing individually.
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4.2 conditional and contingent fees
One way to understand the results of the previous section is the following: for
plainti¤s, the opportunity to obtain additional information may work as a cred-
ible threat in order to obtain recovery from the defendant, although they have
pessimistic beliefs before trial. It is more usual in the literature to consider that
litigation costs, specically attorneys fees, may be used strategically, playing
the role of a device which commits plainti¤s having pessimistic priors (holding
nuisance suits) to le and sue until trial7 .
In the case of class actions, specic attention has been paid to contingent fees
(Klement and Neeman (2004), Lynk (1990,1994), Miceli and Segerson (1991)),
or to conditional fees (Emons (2004a,b), Emons and Garoupa (2004)). The
rational for the use of contingent or conditional fees to pay for attorneys services
is twofold. The rst advantage of contingent fees is that they induce the absence
of risk of lling a lawsuit for plainti¤s, since the risk is borne by the attorney:
plainti¤s owe their attorney a fee only when there is recovery, i:e: when they
win at trial. The other advantage is that they enable plainti¤s to monitor the
e¤ort undertaken by attorney for the time they spend to their clientscase, and
give them e¢ cient incentives to maximize their clients recovery.
When conditional fees are introduced, a plainti¤ pays the amount corre-
sponding to his attorneys services only in the case where he wins at trial.
Hence, the expected payment at trial is equal to the probability to win (given
the relevant information.) times his damage award minus attorneys fees:
pi(Lj!)(i   Cp) : for Pi
pj(Lj!; !0)(j   Cp) : for Pj
pj(Lj!; !0) ( Kp) : for a CA
The following proposition8 shows that in such case, information has no role
to play here, in the sense that the arrival of new information during the litiga-
tion process does not change plainti¤s decision as compared to the decisions
which would be undertaken with no additional information over the information
conveyed by the priors.
7See Rasmusen (2001) for an example; once a plainti¤ sinks his litigation costs, he is
commited to sue as far as he has any chance of success at all - in contrast, he gives up soon
as he is handled with a totally meritless suit.
8When contingent fees are used, a plainti¤ pays an amount corresponding to a xed per-
centage of the value of the claim only in case of recovery, i.e. the costs corresponding to the
payment of attorneys services is proportional to the expected value of the claim; in such a
case, the value of the expected outcome at trial is a given percentage of the claim:.
pi(Lj!)(1  t)i : for Pi
pj(Lj!; !0)(1  t)j : for Pj
pj(Lj!; !0)(1  ) : for a CA
with t (respectively ) 2]0; 1[ being the percentage of the value of the claim in case of an
individual action (collective action) charged by the attorney, and t > :
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Proposition 11 Under both contingent and conditional fees:
i) Parties always settle.
ii) The value of information is null for both plainti¤s.
iii)
iii) the settlement o¤ers are larger than undezr the xed costs rule
Proposition 11 shows that plainti¤s become neutral to the arrival of news
when contingent fees are used, such that the decision to le depends only on
their initial belief of the outcome at trial. This suggests that if contingent fees
may solve agency problems between plainti¤s and their counsel, on the other
hand they may entail pervasive e¤ects such as making victims not enough careful
with the arrival of new information.
The intuition is the following. Consider a plainti¤ with an initial belief on
his case, who wants to verify the quality of his claim at trial: he may use a
simple testcorresponding to buying the services of a lawyer; this last one will
inform the plainti¤whether he has a high probability to win at trial or a law one,
and when alternative litigation strategies may be used at trial, contingent fees
monitors attorneys e¤orts to choose the strategy leading to maximal recovery
for plainti¤. Proposition 11 tells us that this test is of no value for the plainti¤:
his initial decision to enter or not depends only on his prior beliefs on his case,
when contigent fees are used, since in case of an individual suit for example we
have: Eui(i; pi(Lj:)) = Eui(i; pL) and Euj(j ; pj(Lj:; :)) = Euj(j ; pL).
Finally, this characteristic of contingent fees allows us to consider directly
the issue of the deterrence e¤ects of plainti¤s:
Proposition 12 Consider that a class action always exists, whatever the rule
of costs at hand. As compared to the case with xed litigations costs, under
conditional fees9 :
i) there is more deterrence e¤ects on the small claims when the sunk costs
K are large enough, and;
ii) there is also more deterrence e¤ects on the large claims.
5 Conclusion
REFERENCES
9The equivalent result under contingent fees (available on request) is: there is more deter-
rence e¤ects on the small claims; and: there is also more deterrence e¤ects on the large claims
when the savings on attorneysservices Cp  Kp are large enough.
22
Blackwell D. (1953), Equivalent comparison of experiments, Annals of Math-
ematics and Statistics, 24, 265-272.
Caroll S., Hensler D., Abrahamse A., Gross J., White M., Ashwood S. et
Sloss E. (2002): Abestos litigation costs and compensation; Documented Brief-
ing, RAND Institute for Civil Justice, The Manhattan Institute Center for Legal
Policy.
Che Y-K (1996), Equilibrium formation of class action suits, Journal of
Public Economics, 62, 339-361.
Che Y-K and Yi J. (1993), The role of precedents in repeated litigation,
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 9, 399-424.
Emons W. (2004a), Conditional versus contingent fees, mimeo, University
of Bern and CEPR.
Emons W. (2004b), Playing it safe with low conditional fees versus being
insured by high contingent fees, mimeo, University of Bern and CEPR.
Emons W. and Garoupa N. (2004), The economics of US-style contingent
fees and UK-style conditional fees, mimeo, CEPR.
Hensler D., Caroll S., White M. et Gross J., (2001): Abestos litigation in
the U.S.: a new look at a old issue; Documented Brieng DB-362.0-ICJ, RAND
Institute for Civil Justice, The Manhattan Institute Center for Legal Policy.
Hirschleifer J. and Riley J. (1997), The analytics of uncertainty and infor-
mation, Cambridge University Press.
Klement A. and Neeman Z. (2004), Incentive structures for class action
lawyers, The Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 20, 102-124.
La¤ont J-J (1988), The economics of uncertainty and information, MIT
Press.
Lynk W. (1990), The Courts and the market: an economic analysis of con-
tingent fees in class-action litigation, The Journal of Legal Studies, 19, 247-260.
Lynk W. (1994), The Courts and the plainti¤sbar: awarding the attorneys
fees in class-action litigation, The Journal of Legal Studies, 23, 185-209.
Marceau N. and Mongrain S. (2003), Damage averaging and the formation
of class action suits, International Review of Law and Economics, 23, 63-74.
RAND Institute for Civil Justice (2003): Trial Lawyers inc. A report on the
lawsuit industry in America 2003, The Manhattan Institute Center for Legal
Policy.
Rasmusen E. (2001), Games and information, Blackwell Publishing.
Shavell S. (1989), Sharing information prior to settlement or litigation, RAND
Journal of Economics, 20, 183-195.
23
APPENDIX
Proof of lemma 1:
Given that the administrative cost C is sunk, it is easy to see that when
P j obtains the message !0 after that P i has received message !, the defen-
dant chooses a take-it-or-leave-ito¤er in order to render the plainti¤ indi¤er-
ent between going to trial (suing) or accepting the o¤er: hence s(j ; !; !0) =
max
 
0; pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp

, where pj(Lj!; !0) follows R1. Symmetrically, when
he faces the message ! with P i , the defendant makes a take-it-ot-leave-it
o¤er in order to render the plainti¤ indi¤erent between going to trial (suing)
or accepting the o¤er: hence s(i; !) = max
 
0; pi(Lj!)i   Cp

, where pi(Lj!)
follows R2. Hence the result. 
Proof of lemma 2:
i) Consider that min

pj(Lj!; !0);8(!; !0) 2 
 
	  Cpj ; thus, 8(!; !0) 2

  
, it comes that max  0; pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp = pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp, such
that:
X
(!;!0)2
2
pj(!; !0)max
 
0; pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp
  C
=
X
(!;!0)2
2
pj(!; !0)
 
pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp
  C
= pLj   Cp   C
given that, by construction of the technology of information, we have both:
X
(!;!0)2
2
pj(!; !0) = 1;
X
(!;!0)2
2
pj(!; !0)pj(Lj!; !0) =
X
(!;!0)2
2
p(L; !; !0) = pL
Hence the result.
ii) More generally, given that 8(!; !0) 2 

 : max  0; pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp 
pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp, we have after multiplying both terms of this inequality by
pj(!; !0) and then summing over all the possible messages:X
(!;!0)2
2
pj(!; !0)max
 
0; pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp
  C

X
(!;!0)2
2
pj(!; !0)
 
pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp
  C
= pLj   Cp   C
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Hence Euj(j ; pj(Lj:; :))  Euj(j ; pL), which is by denition the value of
the information a¤orded by the available technology of messages. Thus, assum-
ing a unique combination (!; !0) 2 

 : such thatmax  0; pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp =
pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp, the result is direct.
iii) Let us assume that there exists at least one combination of messages
(!^; !^0) 2 
 
 such that p(L; !^; !^0)  Cp+Cj ; remark that this implies:
pj(Lj!^; !^0) = p(L; !^; !^
0)
pj(!^; !^0)
 Cp
pj(!^; !^0)j
 Cp
j
As a result, it comes that:
Euj(j ; p
j(Lj:; :)) = pj(!^; !^0)  pj(Lj!^; !^0)j   Cp
+
X
(!;!0) 6=(!^;!^0)
pj(!; !0)max
 
0; pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp
  C
 p(L; !^; !^0)j   pj(!^; !^0)Cp   C
 p(L; !^; !^0)j   Cp   C
since by construction
P
(!;!0) 6=(!^;!^0) p
j(!; !0)max
 
0; pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp
 
0: Now, given that p(L; !^; !^0)j   Cp   C  0 by assumption, we obtain
Euj(j ; p
j(Lj:; :))  0. Hence the result. 
Proof of lemma 3: omitted (qualitatively the same as in lemma 2).
Proof of proposition 4:
More specically, we prove the following results:
Claim 13 Assume that there exists at least one combination of messages (!^; !^0) 2


 such that p(L; !^; !^0)  Cp+Ci ; then there is a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
which corresponds to the following set of actions:
1/ Each plainti¤ les individually.
2/ The defendant makes two individual o¤ers:
s(i; !) = max
 
0; pi(Lj!)i   Cp

;8! 2 
 for Pi , and
s(j ; !; !
0) = max
 
0; pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp

;8(!; !0) 2 
 
 for Pj
3/ Each plainti¤ accepts10 (at each decision node where he has to play) his
specic individual o¤er proposed by the defendant, for every possible information
he may receive.
10Remember that the present model allows for multiplicity of equilibria, since plainti¤s
are indi¤erent in stage 3 between two actions T and S; but this introduces only technical
di¢ culties, and we ignore other SPE.
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Proof of claim 13. To prove 1/ it is su¢ cient to remark that if there exists
at least one combination of messages (!^; !^0) 2 
  
 such that p(L; !^; !^0) 
Cp+C
i
, then we also have:
- p(L; !^; !^0)  Cp+Cj ; thus, by part v) of lemma 2, P j always les, given that
he accepts any o¤er s(j ; !; !0) = max
 
0; pj(Lj!^; !^0)j   Cp

;
- pi(L; !^)  P!02
 p(L; !^; !0) > p(L; !^; !^0)  Cp+Ci ; thus, by part v) of
lemma 3, P i accepts the o¤er s(i; !) = max
 
0; pi(Lj!^)i   Cp

; and he always
les. 2/ and 3/ are direct from lemma 1. 
Proof of lemma 6: as lemma 1, it is straightforward since K is sunk. 
Proof of lemma 7:
Consider the subgame where the defendant o¤ers s(j ; !; !0) to Pj , which
is accepted. Remark rst that if the subset j  
2 exists, for any (!; !0) 2
j ; P j may obtain a positive payment equal to max
 
0; pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp

=
pj(Lj!; !0)j  Cp  0. Thus, following the proof of part v) in lemma 2, had he
decided to sue individually, P 0j s expected utility level would be positive since:
Euj(j ; p
j(Lj:; :)) 
X
(!;!0)2j
p(L; !; !0)j   Cp   C  0
given that by construction for any (!; !0) 2 j : p(L; !; !0)j  Cp + C:
Now for any message (!; !0) 2 
  
, in order that P j be better o¤ when he
joins the class action rather than to have sued individually, it must be that:
pj(Lj!; !0) Kp  pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp
which is true as far as   Cp Kppj(Lj!;!0)(j i) . Hence assume that  
  Cp Kp(j i) where  = max

pj(Lj!; !0); for all (!; !0) 2 j
	
; then for
any (!; !0) 2 j :
pj(Lj!; !0) Kp  K  pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp  K  pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp   C
Finally, after multiplying both the LHS and the RHS terms of this inequality
by pj(!; !0) and then summing over all the possible messages, we obtain:
Euj(; p
j(Lj:; :))  Euj(j ; pj(Lj:; :))  0
Hence the result. 
Proof of lemma 8:
The crucial issue is whether the rst plainti¤ prefers the structure of infor-
mation dened only by the set of his own personal messages, or the structure of
information associated to the set of combinations of two messages, his personal
ones and the messages of the other plainti¤. We shall show that the second
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one is more informative in the sense of Blackwell (1953) than the rst one; as a
result, Pi obtains a higher expected utility with the second one.
To understand this, remark that by (R2) for any message ! 2 
 we have:
pi(Lj!) =
X
!02

p(L; !; !0)P
!02
 p(L; !; !0) +
P
!02
 p(NL;!; !0)
=
X
!02


p(L; !; !0) + p(NL;!; !0)P
!02
 p(L; !; !0) +
P
!02
 p(NL;!; !0)

p(L; !; !0)
p(L; !; !0) + p(NL;!; !0)

which means that the following relationship linking P 0is the two types of
posterior beliefs pi(Lj:) and pj(Lj:; :) always applies:
8! 2 
 : pi(Lj!) =
X
!02

(!; !0)pj(Lj!; !0) (1)
with (!; !0) = p
i(!;!0)
pi(!) < 1 and
P
!02
 (!; !
0) = 1; meaning that the poste-
riors pj(Lj:; :) are more spread than the posteriors pj(Lj:); i.e. for any message
! 2 
; there always exists at least one message !0 2 
 such that: pj(Lj!; !0) >
pi(Lj!); and there always exists at least one message !00 2 
 such that: pj(Lj!; !00) <
pi(Lj!): By denition, this amounts to say that the posteriors pj(Lj:; :) are more
informative than the posteriors pj(Lj:). This is useful in the rest of the proof.
When Pi initiates a class action, and when Pj joins it, information sharing
between plainti¤s leads to an expected utility level for the former which is by
denition:
Eui(; p
j(Lj:; :)) =
X
(!;!0)2
2
pi(!; !0)max
 
0; pj(Lj!; !0) Kp
 K
with pi(Lj!; !0) = pj(Lj!; !0); 8(!; !0) 2 
2, whereas if Pi les an individual
suit, he obtains:
Eui(i; p
i(Lj:)) =
X
!2

pi(!)max
 
0; pi(Lj!)i   Cp
  C
Hence, Pi initiates the class action more particularly soon as:
Eui(; p
j(Lj:; :))  Eui(i; pi(Lj:))  0 (2)
Let us exhibit simple conditions under which the RHS inequality in (2) is
true. For that, assume that there exists a subset of message i  
 such that
any !^ 2 i satises: pi(L; !^)  Cp+Ci ; which implies that pi(Lj!^) 
Cp
i
; as a
consequence, it is easy to see that:
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Eui(i; p
i(Lj:)) =
X
!^2i
pi(!^)
 
pi(Lj!^)i   Cp
  C

X
!^2i
pi(L; !^)i   Cp   C
 0
Remark now that by (1), we have pi(Lj!^)i Cp =
P
!02
 (!^; !
0)pj(Lj!^; !0)i 
Cp, for any any !^ 2 i; implying thus:
X
!02

(!^; !0)pj(Lj!^; !0)i   Cp 
X
!02

(!^; !0)
 
pj(Lj!^; !0)i   Cp


X
!02

(!^; !0)max
 
0; pj(Lj!^; !0)i   Cp

Pre-multiplying by pi(!^); summing over all !^ 2 i, and nally rearranging,
we obtain:
X
!^2i
pi(!^)
 
pi(Lj!^)i   Cp
  X
!^2i
X
!02

pi(!^)(!^; !0)max
 
0; pj(Lj!^; !0)i   Cp

=
X
!^2i
X
!02

pi(!^; !0)max
 
0; pj(Lj!^; !0)i   Cp


X
(!;!0)2
2
pi(!; !0)max
 
0; pj(Lj!; !0)i   Cp

= Eui(i; p
j(Lj:; :))
Now, given that > i and using assumption 2, it comes that: Eui(; pj(Lj:; :)) 
Eui(i; p
j(Lj:; :)): Hence (2) holds, and the lemma 8 is proven: 
Proof of proposition 9:
Once more, we prove the following claim:
Claim 14 Assume that: (C1) there exists a unique combination of messages
(!; !0) 2 
2 such that p(L; !^; !^0)  Cp+Ci , and (C2):   ^ 
Cp Kp
pj(Lj!^;!^0)(j i) :
Then, there is a SPE associated to the following set of actions:
1/ Each plainti¤ les.
2/ Pi initiates the class action, and Pj joins it.
3/ The defendant makes three o¤ers:
s(i; !) = max
 
0; pi(Lj!)i   Cp

;8! 2 
 for Pi
s(j ; !; !
0) = max
 
0; pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp

;8(!; !0) 2 
 
 for Pj
s(; !; !0) = max
 
0; pj(Lj!; !0) Kp

;8(!; !0) 2 
 
 for a CA
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4/ At each decision node in stage 3 where he has to choose an action, each
plainti¤ accepts the o¤er (either individually or as a member of the class action)
proposed by the defendant11 , for every possible information they may receive.
Proof of claim 14. To prove 1/ and 2/ it is su¢ cient to remark that
if there exists a unique combination of messages (!^; !^0) 2 
  
 such that
p(L; !^; !^0)  Cp+Ci , then we also have:
- pj(Lj!^; !^0)  p(L; !^; !^0)  Cp+Cj ; thus, if  
Cp Kp
pj(Lj!^;!^0)(j i) by lemma
7, P j always les and joins the class action initiated by the other plainti¤;
- pi(Lj!^)  pi(L; !^)  p(L; !^; !^0)+P!0 6=!^0 p(L; !^; !0) > p(L; !^; !^0)  Cp+Ci ;
thus, by lemma 8, P i always les and initiated the class action,
Finally, 3/ and 4/ are direct from lemma 5. 
Proof of proposition 10:
It is su¢ cient to prove that, for any message pertaining to the subset j  
2
dened in lemma 6, and for any value of , there always exists a  2 [0; 1] such
that:
pj(Lj!; !0)dj  Kp  pj(Lj!; !0)j   Cp
with dj = i + (1  )j , which is equivalent to:
  Cp  Kp
pj(Lj!; !0) (j   i)
Hence the result. 
Proof of proposition 11:
Consider the case of the rst type of plainti¤s. Equivalent arguments may
be obtained in the case of the second plainti¤ and in the case of a class action.
When conditional or contingent fees are introduced, the defendants best
o¤ers to plainti¤ i in stage 3 are the following, under assumption 2:
s(i; !) = max
 
0; pi(Lj!)(i   Cp)

= pi(Lj!)(i   Cp) : under conditional fees
s(i; !) = max
 
0; pi(Lj!)(1  t)i

= pi(Lj!)(1  t)i : under contingent fees
i) Thus, whatever the message, the plainti¤ always obtains a positive pay-
ment - thus, he always accepts the defendants o¤er.
ii) As a result, the plainti¤individual expected utility level in case of indi-
vidual suits is equal to:
11Once more, we do not tackle with the problem of multiplicity of equilibria, only focusing
on the equilibrium path where the class action is formed.
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Eui(i; p
i(Lj:)) = pL(i   Cp)  C = Eui(i; pL) (3)
Notice that by assumption 1: Euj(j ; pL) > Eui(i; pL): It is straightfor-
ward to see that individual suits are both benecial for the plainti¤s soon as
Eui(i; pL)  0; meaning that their common priors must satisfy: pL  Ci Cp .
iii) Finally, both contingent and conditional fees (for a normalized cost :
ti = Cp) allows for higher settlement o¤ers, given that they induce a decrease
in the expected payments from plainti¤s to their attorney:
pi(Lj!)i   Cp > pi(Lj!)(i   Cp) : under conditional fees
pi(Lj!)i   Cp > pi(Lj!)(1  t)i : under contingent fees
as compared to the xed costs system of the previous section.
?????????Proof of proposition 12.????? More specically, we now prove
the following results:
Claim 15 Consider that class actions are allowed, and assume that: (C1) pL 
C
i Cp and (C2)  
Cp Kp
j i . When conditional fees apply, there exists a unique
SPE associated to the following actions:
1/ Each plainti¤ les.
2/ Pi initiates the class action, and Pj joins it.
3/ The defendant makes sets of o¤ers:
s(i; !) = p
i(Lj!)(i   Cp);8! 2 
 for Pi
s(j ; !; !
0) = pj(Lj!; !0)(j   Cp);8(!; !0) 2 
 
 for Pj
s(; !; !0) = pj(Lj!; !0)( Kp);8(!; !0) 2 
 
 for a CA
4/ At each decision node in stage 3 where he has to choose an action, each
plainti¤ accepts the o¤er (either individually or as a member of the class action)
proposed by the defendant, for each possible information they may receive.
The equivalent result holds for contingent fees.
Proof of claim 15. Assume now that class actions are allowed. Notice
that, in such a case where the class action is formed, each plainti¤ accepts the
collective o¤er to the class action since  Kp > 0, and both plainti¤s obtain
the same expected utility level which is equal to: pL( Kp) K:
Thus consider P 0js e¢ cient decisions in stage 2. At the decision node where
he chooses either to le individually or to join the class action, he chooses to
join the class action soon as  Kp  j Cp for any combination of messages,
meaning that we must have:   Cp Kp(j i) . Finally, at his rst decision node, he
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also chooses to le rather than not le if pL( Kp) K  0 or equivalently:
pL  K Kp :
Consider now P 0is e¢ cient decisions in stage 1; it is straightforward to see
that soon as:
pL( Kp) K  pL(i   Cp)  C  0
Then, on the one hand, he prefers to initiate a class action rather than to
sue individually (at his decision node following his entry), while on the second
he always les rather than opt out the litigation process. Remark that the LHS
of this last inequality is always satised given that for P 0i when a class action is
formed, it induces both an increase in the expected payment at trial ( > i)
and a decrease in the litigation costs (assumption 2). For its own, the RHS
inequality is satised once: pL  Ci Cp :
Given the assumptions made on the various litigation costs, it is straightfor-
ward to show that Ci Cp >
K
 Kp . Hence the result. 
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